Abstract: This paper examines the persistence of cooperative federalism in intergovernmental administrative relations despite the rise of coercive federalism and the transformation of the party system since the late 1960s and seeks to explain the persistence of that cooperation. This persistence is due partly to deep path dependence and also to the multi-dimensionality of the federal system in which coercion in the policy-making realm of elected officials coexists with continued cooperation in the administrative realm and dualism within the realms of policymaking still available for state action. Some traditional tools of cooperation, especially the carrots of grants-in-aid continue today, although more sticks are now wielded by the federal government than in the past.
government toward centralization. 6 The federal principles set forth by these theorists, especially partnership, comity, and reciprocity, hark back to the bygone days when the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 7 and state advisory commissions on intergovernmental relations 8 were pinnacle institutional expressions of cooperative federalism.
Those institutions are gone, as are the days of the American partnership so beloved by Dan Elazar. 9 Instead, as U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) commented to me in 1988, "there is no political capital in intergovernmental relations," that is, in catering to the concerns of governors, state legislators, county commissioners, mayors, township supervisors, and the like. Reflecting this centrist orientation is in the fact that about 50 percent of senators and 42 percent of congressmen who leave Congress remain in Washington, DC, compared to only about 3 percent who did so near the outset of coercive federalism in 1974. 10 State and local officials continue to lobby federal officials, but they are rarely partners in federal policy-making, although many are now partisan cheerleaders for and boo hurlers against federal policy developments. State and local officials usually gain no federal policy concessions or only minor concessions on their own. They ordinarily garner major federal policy concessions only when powerful non-governmental interests are aligned with state and local goals. Elected federal officials, as well as the unelected judges on the federal courts, are highly responsive to electoral coalitions, interest groups, and campaign contributors and correspondingly less responsive to elected state and local government officials. These officials have no privileged voice in Congress or the White House as elected representatives of the peoples of the 50 states; instead, they must behave like interest-group lobbyists and compete with all the other interest groups in the federal policymaking arena where, frequently, they cannot prevail against powerful interests that bring crucial financial, ideological, and voter rewards and punishments to bear on the electoral fortunes of federal officials. Morton Grodzins' observation, which was perhaps accurate in 1960, that there is a "comprehensive, day-to-day, even hour-by-hour, impact of local views on national programs" now reads like mythic history.
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Coercive Federalism
American federalism today can be described as coercive, compared to previous eras often termed dual and cooperative federalism. The current era is "coercive" because the period's predominant political, fiscal, statutory, regulatory, and judicial trends entail impositions of federal policies and rules on state and local governments. This overt face of American federalism marks an era that began in the late 1960s and succeeded a roughly 35-year era of cooperative federalism.
The term "coercive federalism" describes an era in which (a) the federal government is the dominant policymaker, (b) the federal government is able to assert its policy will unilaterally over the state and local governments, (c) elected state and local officials are more often lobbyists than partners in intergovernmental policy-making, (d) interactions between federal officials and elected state and local officials are more often consultations than negotiations, (e) there are few constitutional limits on the exercise of federal power, (f) cooperative policy-making, when it occurs, is most often due to the influence of interest groups operating outside the intergovernmental system than to state and local officials operating inside the intergovernmental system, and (g) all important
arenas of state and local decision-making are infused with federal rules. 12 Coercive federalism has been characterized by a shift of federal policymaking from the interests of places (i.e., state and local governments) to the interests of persons (i.e., voters, 
Dual Federalist Revolts Against Coercive Federalism
The federal system is multi-dimensional, however, and soon after the rise of coercive 
Intergovernmental Administrative Cooperation
The conceit that the federal government knows best and has an obligation to impose the right answer on the states is a key attitudinal characteristic of coercive federalism. Fourth, the combative, partisan character of most liberal and conservative state activism does not foster state-federal cooperation or partnership.
Leaving behind political and judicial policymaking to enter the realm of administration, however, one finds fairly consistent patterns of intergovernmental cooperation, the catastrophe of Intergovernmental cooperation was, as both Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elazar contended, prevalent from the start of the federal republic and throughout the nineteenth-century era of socalled dual federalism. 27 Grodzins, especially, attributed this cooperation to the country's "mildly chaotic" noncentralized party system. Apparently reacting against the APSA's 1950 call for more nationalized and disciplined parties, Cooperation accelerated tremendously during the twentieth-century era of cooperative federalism. 28 Grodzins warned that such parties would destroy cooperative federalism. 29 Grodzins was correct insofar as nationalization of the party system has been a major factor in the rise of coercive federalism, but because of deep institutionalized roots and path dependence, coercive federalism in the policy-making realm has not choked off cooperation in the administrative realm; on the contrary, implementation of many of the policies imposed on state and local governments requires intergovernmental cooperation for success. This Numerous federal-court consent decrees of long standing, many of which emanated from citizen lawsuits, now govern many aspects of administration in all states and perhaps most local governments. 32 Federal officials, in seeking to foster compliance, ordinarily negotiate and bargain with state and local officials before seeking judicial intervention, but the prospect of such intervention has a sobering effect on state and local cooperation with federal officials and policy rules. 33 Additionally, the U.S. federal system is not one of executive federalism (e.g., Germany) whereby states are constitutionally obligated to execute federal framework-legislation. The federal government is expected, for the most part, to carry out its own policies or pay the states to do so. Given its very limited administrative capabilities, the federal government must seek the assistance of state and local officials. Additionally, state and local administrators frequently advocate expansive actions and higher spending in their policy field and, thus, often welcome federal intervention. State and local environmental officials, for example, are likely to welcome federal rules that set stricter environmental standards and require more state and local spending on environmental protection.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for state and local bureaucrats to lobby for federal policies that are opposed by state and local elected officials who can be punished at the ballot box for implementing unpopular federal policies or raising taxes in order to pay for state or local implementation of those policies. The State Administrators Project found over the decades that federal aid and regulations promoted "constant, consequential, and pervasive" state agency autonomy from gubernatorial and legislative oversight. 36 Interest groups play a role, too. After achieving a federal policy objective, they pressure state and local governments to cooperate in implementing that objective. There has been tremendous growth in interest-group activity within the states since the late 1960s; one cause of growth has been the need for interest groups to induce cooperative state and local compliance with national policy objectives supported by the interest groups.
A process of socialization has occurred, as well. The dominance of the federal government in so many policy fields for the past 44 years of coercive federalism became an unquestioned fact of administrative life. Furthermore, many of today's senior federal, state, and local administrators entered public service in the late 1960s and early 1970s with a common passion for reform. For rank-and-file administrators, the origins of their work dictates are less important to them than their preoccupation with how to implement those dictates and satisfy the citizens who will ultimately vote for or against the elected officials who preside only in a general and distant way over policy implementation. 
Conclusion
Near-term changes in policy will be instituted by new congressional and presidential regimes in Washington, DC, but the long-term trends in federalism will remain largely on course because coercive federalism has been a bipartisan phenomenon, and because no significant changes in the alignment of political and socioeconomic forces that propel coercive federalism appear to be on the horizon. At the same time, manifestations of dual federalism are likely to persist as both political parties continue to use levers of state and local power to pummel the other party in power in Washington, DC. State activism will ebb and flow depending on the party composition of the federal government and the policies generated by that composition.
The seemingly paradoxical persistence of intergovernmental administrative cooperation is surely due, in part, to the path dependence produced by a long history of such cooperation.
Furthermore, even during the height of cooperative federalism, cooperation was largely defined as the willingness of state and local governments to implement federal policies. but the price of not volunteering is that the federal government itself establishes an exchange within the state. This is a significant escalation of federal intrusion into state affairs. In summary, many of the tools of cooperation deployed by the federal government also come with more sticks than in the past.
Finally, and quite importantly, intergovernmental administrative cooperation under coercive federalism seems to be associated with the rise of an intergovernmental bureaucratic complex that is lubricated by interest-group activity and substantially more autonomous and free from oversight by elected state and local officials compared to the heyday of cooperative federalism when elected state and local officials had more voice in and influence on all aspects of intergovernmental relations. Hence, the nature of contemporary cooperation is only modestly voluntary and distantly subject to democratic self-government.
